Indeed, de-escalation may not be an option once the Chinese order such an IW attack.
The literature suggests that Chinese strategists tend to conceptualize IW in the broadest terms possible.
Finally, the author speculates on how Chinese thinking on IW could impact its future application.
Whether the Chinese have reached the wrong conclusions on IW within their unique political context remains unclear.
Third, as mentioned before, the frailties of offensive and defensive IW strategies make them vulnerable to countermeasures.
In any case, it is clear that an assessment of Chinese IW literature produces more questions than answers.
Hence, even the most transparent countries developing IW have been very reluctant to reveal their strategies and capabilities.
Historically, the concept of offensive IW has been a tightly held secret even within the United States itself.
An area that deserves close study is the apparent attraction among Chinese strategists to IW as a preemptive weapon.
As a latecomer to the realm of IW, China has little foundation on which to base its intellectual discourse.
Hence, IW as an alternative to conventional military power may not be sustainable or realistic in the long term.
One analyst argues that IW combat is a struggle between the command and control systems of the opposing forces.
Despite its theoretical appeal, preemption as an IW strategy represents a double-edged sword.
This extreme scenario of course assumes that the Chinese IW strategy actually works.
One of the enduring puzzles is how China might employ IW in the event of crisis involving the United States.
Given the uncertainties surrounding the probability of success in employing IW, the Chinese might also be constrained by these considerations.
The literature survey on Chinese views of IW and its convergence with preemption also leads to some other unsettling conclusions.
In particular, the concept of information warfare (IW) has emerged as a subject of great interest in Chinese military discourse.
Once such powers of IW are unleashed in a preemptive attack, the ability to control and calibrate forces becomes extremely difficult.
At present no clear consensus has yet emerged in China on the specific aspects of IW the Chinese hope to develop.
It is clear then, that the use of IW for preemptive purposes could be highly escalatory and unstable in crisis situations.
How China will translate theoretical discussions on IW into practice will be an increasingly important policy question for the United States.
Chinese strategists agree that both the offensive and defensive elements of IW require a robust and effective command and control system.
Mr. Yoshihara examines those aspects of IW PSYOPS, Denial, and Deception that China believes provides the greatest prospects for victory in a conflict.
Examining and weighing the likelihood of Beijing resorting to IW against the United States is therefore a policy-relevant and extremely elusive task.
In short, the ability to gather and process information appears to have become a panacea in warfare for many Chinese IW strategists.
In court, IW presented its case, knowing of a possible legal difficulty.
Second, there were fears that touting offensive IW might engender enmity on the part of adversaries in an act of self-fulfilling prophesy.
Paradoxically, he observes that the Chinese have not gleaned their intelligence through espionage, but through careful scrutiny of U.S. IW in practice.
As Mulvenon suggests, under certain circumstances, IW could lead to decisive results.
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