The literature suggests that Chinese strategists tend to conceptualize IW in the broadest terms possible.
Finally, the author speculates on how Chinese thinking on IW could impact its future application.
Third, as mentioned before, the frailties of offensive and defensive IW strategies make them vulnerable to countermeasures.
In any case, it is clear that an assessment of Chinese IW literature produces more questions than answers.
Historically, the concept of offensive IW has been a tightly held secret even within the United States itself.
Hence, even the most transparent countries developing IW have been very reluctant to reveal their strategies and capabilities.
Hence, IW as an alternative to conventional military power may not be sustainable or realistic in the long term.
One analyst argues that IW combat is a struggle between the command and control systems of the opposing forces.
Despite its theoretical appeal, preemption as an IW strategy represents a double-edged sword.
Once such powers of IW are unleashed in a preemptive attack, the ability to control and calibrate forces becomes extremely difficult.
At present no clear consensus has yet emerged in China on the specific aspects of IW the Chinese hope to develop.
It is clear then, that the use of IW for preemptive purposes could be highly escalatory and unstable in crisis situations.
Chinese strategists agree that both the offensive and defensive elements of IW require a robust and effective command and control system.
In court, IW presented its case, knowing of a possible legal difficulty.
Second, there were fears that touting offensive IW might engender enmity on the part of adversaries in an act of self-fulfilling prophesy.
As Mulvenon suggests, under certain circumstances, IW could lead to decisive results.
Finally, IW, if sophisticated enough, could create adequate levels of plausible deniability.
Rattray argues that strategic IW can only reasonably achieve an offensive advantage.
The second component of the monograph assesses the existing Chinese IW literature.
To succeed in IW, one must achieve information superiority over the enemy.
The mobile Internet is where he sees China breaking through, but so far IW has not funded anything all that futuristic on the horizon.
FORBES: Kai-Fu Lee Talks Steve Jobs, China Angels, Next Gen Tech
Since the concept of IW emerged in the mid-1990s as a topic of heated debate, its definition remains in a state of continual flux.
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) International Waters (IW) focal area targets transboundary water systems, such as shared river basins, lakes, groundwater and large marine ecosystems.
In the tradition of Sun Tzu, Chinese analysts of IW assert that knowledge can be assembled together in a rational and coherent manner that would produce inevitable victory.
Rather than the deterrent effect expected from IW (much as the Japanese planners of the surprise attack against Pearl Harbor had hoped), a reckless application of information operations could provoke massive retaliation.
Recent Chinese literature on IW also suggests that strategists have gradually developed a deeper understanding of IW. Indeed, some general conclusions on the future of IW may be coalescing among Chinese analysts.
While not an exact scientific measure, a sampling of U.S. doctrinal writings on IW could provide a useful frame of reference and possibly some context for comparison between Chinese and American thinking.
However, strategists broaden IW attacks beyond warfighting purposes.
Interestingly, these capabilities almost mirror U.S. doctrine on IW. While the views on specific types of IW differ somewhat between various analysts, several discrete IW applications have dominated recent discourse from the late 1990s to the present.
What has given IW those enviable gains?
FORBES: Kai-Fu Lee Talks Steve Jobs, China Angels, Next Gen Tech
应用推荐