Yet, the United States remains in total compliance with its commitments under the Biological Weapons Convention.
Most recently, decided not to agree to a protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
The U.S. must also avoid the present temptation to repeat the mistakes inherent in the Biological Weapons Convention.
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In 1985, President Reagan found these indications sufficiently worrisome to charge the USSR with violating the Biological Weapons Convention.
Further, we supported the implementation of actions called for by the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference in December 2011.
WHITEHOUSE: Joint Statement of the 4th ASEAN-U.S. Leaders' Meeting
For years, American policy makers have treated the growing menace of noncompliance with the Biological Weapons Convention with benign neglect.
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Hence, to abide by the Biological Weapons Convention they do not need this protocol that is merely supposed to strengthen the convention.
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The Soviet Union signed the Biological Weapons Convention agreeing never to develop biological weapons, and then conducted a massive secret effort to do just that.
In 1972, the U.S. and virtually every other civilized nation signed the Biological Weapons Convention, which prohibits the development, stockpiling and use of biological arms.
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This scuttled treaty is known as the BWC Protocol, since it purports to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 that bans the use, stockpiling and production of bacteriological weapons.
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In addition, Russia continues to violate its international arms control obligations, including -- but not limited to -- the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the INF Treaty, the START I Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and various chemical weapons conventions.
The result was graphically illustrated in the course of the war with Iraq: Notwithstanding the Biological Weapons Convention, the enemy was equipped with lethal viruses and the United States was forced to rush hastily ginned-up and inadequately tested antidotes and less-than-effective defensive systems into the theater of operations.
The Biological Weapons Convention would afford foreign intelligence services and business competitors access to many of the United States's most sensitive proprietary processes and data in the fields of biotechnology and genetic engineering all without contributing appreciably to the deterrence or detection of covert and illegal BW activities.
To paraphrase the English wit, Samuel Johnson, who described second marriages as "the triumph of hope over experience, " it was absolutely predictable that prohibitions imposed by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1989 Chemical Weapons Convention would be no more successful in creating universally binding international "norms" than was the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which was supposed to ban all war.
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The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention was supposed to preclude the production or stockpiling of agents for biological warfare (BW).
Collecting signatures from renegade leaders of pariah states instead of policing and enforcing existing, and violated, agreements like the 1925 convention banning first-use of chemical arms or the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention is irresponsible escapism.
Collecting signatures from renegade leaders of pariah states -- instead of policing and enforcing existing, and violated, agreements like the 1925 convention banning first-use of chemical arms or the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention -- is irresponsible escapism.
The Center for Security Policy believes the United States is now poised to repeat the mistakes of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.
The Center for Security Policy believes the United States is now perilously poised to repeat the mistakes of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.
The use of chemical and biological weapons are banned under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The target this time was a draft scheme to enforce the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), a 1972 treaty banning germ war.
Inserted into the department to oversee the destruction of the ABM treaty, Mr Bolton was also instrumental in torpedoing international negotiations in Geneva earlier this month aimed at enforcing the toothless 1972 biological weapons convention.
The Bush administration also said it considered the 1972 convention on biological weapons flawed beyond repair, though it has been ratified by 143 countries, including the United States.
At a minimum, it provides a powerful incentive to an adversary to exploit the inadequacies of the existing international convention banning biological weapons and attendant U.S. (and, more generally, Western) vulnerabilities.
The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons.
Unfortunately, in their zeal to promote a wholly unverifiable, unenforceable and widely violated Biological Weapons Convention, arms controllers are suggesting that the American government has breached, if not the letter of that accord, certainly its spirit.
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