• The problem of designing an efficient economic contest under dual information asymmetry, i. e. under which agency problems of adverse selection and moral hazard may co exist is explored.

    研究双重信息不对称悖逆选择德行为并存下,有效经济竞赛机制之设计问题

    youdao

  • The problem of designing an efficient economic contest under dual information asymmetry, i. e. under which agency problems of adverse selection and moral hazard may co exist is explored.

    研究双重信息不对称悖逆选择德行为并存下,有效经济竞赛机制之设计问题

    youdao

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