And it seems that if we accept the body view, we have to say being a person is not an essential property of being something like me.

似乎如果我们接受了肉体理论，就必须说作为一个人,并不是作为我的基本性质。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

If we say that to be a person is to be a P-functioning body, it seems then as though we have to conclude that when you're not P-functioning, you're dead.

如果说人是一个有人格功能性的实体，似乎就能得出以下结论,如果你没有人格功能性，你就是死亡的。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

But notice that that label,personal identity, the problem of personal identity, seems to have built into it the assumption that whatever it is that's me is going to be a person.

但请注意这个标签，个人认同感，个人认同感的问题，似乎是建立在这样一个假设上,无论我是什么，都将是一个人。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

It seems plausible to think that whether or not a person can survive or continue to exist after the death of his or her body should depend on how he's built, what he's made of, what his or her parts are.

这似乎可以理解成,一个人的肉体死亡后,能否幸存或继续存在,是取决于他的构造,他的组成部分,他或她各部分的构件

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选