• More specifically, dualists like Descartes struggle to explain how a physical body connects to an immaterial soul.

    更进一步,像笛卡尔一样的二元论者努力想要解释,生理客体是如何与无形心灵相联系的

    耶鲁公开课 - 心理学导论课程节选

  • Appeal to a physical body suffices, I think, to have an explanation as to the difference between an animated and an inanimate body, how bodies will move in nonrandom ways.

    我认为,如果我们能分辨生命体和,非生命体的区别,理解我们的非随机行为,就足以解释有关物理的肉体的一切问题了

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • It's just something that's in his body; it's physical.

    这是完全深入了他骨子里的;,实实在在的东西。

    耶鲁公开课 - 1945年后的美国小说课程节选

  • Milton's Lycidas' body is still in some way a physical one.

    弥尔顿所写的利西达斯的身体仍然是物质的,具体的。

    耶鲁公开课 - 弥尔顿课程节选

  • Not a very interesting physical body.

    不是什么有趣的物质实体

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • Well, there are the various parts of our physical body, but there's also our soul. Remember, as I said, in introducing the Phaedo, Plato doesn't so much argue for the existence of something separate, the soul, as presuppose it.

    肉体由许多不同的部件组成,但是同样也有灵魂,我在介绍斐多篇的时候,提到柏拉图并没有花大力气,去辩证肉体之外存在个什么东西,他直接默认了灵魂的存在

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • We can certainly think about the forms, but if they're non-physical they can't be grasped by something physical like the body.

    我们当然能想象型相,但假如他们是非现实的,他们将不能被现实的事物,比如肉体,所认知

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • There are views where mind and body are just two different ways of looking at the same underlying reality where the underlying reality is neither physical nor mental.

    有一些观点认为,心灵和肉体是审视同一,现实基础的截然不同的方式,这种现实基础既非肉体也非心智

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • So the mere fact that we decide, if we do ultimately decide that there is a soul, something nonphysical, separate and distinct from the body, doesn't guarantee that we survive our physical death.

    根据我们仅有的事实去判断,如果我们最终判定灵魂是存在的,它是一种无形的,独立的,与肉体截然不同的东西,但仍不能保证我们会在肉体死亡后活下来

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • If that which grasps the ideas or the forms must be eternal/non-physical, well one thing we're going to get is, since that which grasps the forms must be non-physical, the soul is not the body.

    假如能认知,理念或者型相的事物必须是永恒,非现实的,那么我们能得到的结论是,既然能认知型相的事物必须是非现实的,而且灵魂并不是肉体

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • On the one hand, even if it were true that the soul must be non-physical in order to grasp the non-physical forms, wouldn't follow that the soul will survive the death of the body.

    一方面,即使,灵魂必须是非现实的,以便来认知非现实的型相,也没法推导出,灵魂可以在肉体死亡之后存活

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • So on the monist view-- which we'll call "Physicalism," because it says that what people just are, are these physical objects--on the physicalist view, a person is just a body that can...you fill in the blank.

    所以一元论观点,我们称作其为"物理主义",因为它认为人只不过,是个物理对象,物理主义认为,人只是可以...你能举出很多例子

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • We now have two rival explanations, the soul, dualist, explanation that we went into the other world and the physicalist, promissory note that we can explain the white lights and the feeling of euphoria and seeing your body from a distance in physical terms.

    我们现在有两个对立的解释,二元论解释是灵魂,因此我们进入,到了另一个世界的,而物理主义,从物理角度,用期票解释了,白光,兴奋的感觉,以及在远处看到自己身体的现象

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

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