An incentive compatible contract model is developed for interruptible load management, which can lead customers to voluntarily reveal their true outage costs information.
文中提出了一种激励相容的可中断负荷管理合同模型，可引导用户自愿披露真实缺电成本信息。
Based on mechanism design and linear supply function equilibrium (LSFE) of game theory, an incentive compatible mechanism called incentive revelation mechanism of linear supply function is designed.
基于博弈论中的机制设计理论和线性供应函数均衡(LSFE)理论，设计了一种激励相容的线性供应函数激励显示机制。
Based on mechanism design and linear supply function equilibrium (LSFE) of game theory, an incentive compatible mechanism called incentive revelation mechanism of linear supply function is designed.
基于博弈论中的机制设计理论和线性供应函数均衡(LSFE)理论，设计了一种激励相容的线性供应函数激励显示机制。
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