• 微弱 - 引用次数：1

  This paper finds that the real payoff can strongly impact the degree of the trust, the player can sacrifice to trust their opponent in a extension, but if the payoff is larger than this extension, that is to say their trust will be feebleness while the cost is large, the players become the traditional self-interest.

  本文还发现委托代理关系中的信任会受到实际支付的强烈影响,博弈参与者愿为信任对方而承担的可能损失是有限的,一旦超过界限,也就是说当相信对方所面临的成本很大时,他们之间的信任就非常微弱了,此时,他们又变为传统经济学所定义的自利主义者。

  参考来源 - 基于信任博弈的委托代理关系实验与模型研究

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