This paper studies the incentive mechanism of supply chain coordination with a risk-averse retailer.

探讨了一类具有风险规避特性的零售商加盟的供应链协作契约机制设计问题。

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Each risk averse retailer can get a satisfactory contract from the menu and will raise the order quantity to get a maximum expected benefit, which in turn maximizes the distributor's expected profit.

风险厌恶型的零售商从中能够得到满意的合同，同时可使经销商的期望利润最大化，零售商也会因此增加订购数量，从而获得最大期望价值。

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For a supply chain with a risk averse supplier and a risk averse retailer, the optimal channel prices are studied under non-competition environment.

针对具有风险规避特征的制造商和零售商组成的双渠道供应链，分析非竞争环境下双渠道供应链中产品在不同渠道的最优定价；

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